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HANDLING WTO DISPUTES WITH PRIVATE SECTOR: THE 
TRIUMPHANT BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE 
Amrita Bahri*1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Multiple scholarly works have argued that developing country Members of World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) should enhance their dispute settlement capacity to successfully and 
cost-effectively navigate the system of WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). It is 
one thing to be a part of WTO agreements and know the WTO rules, and the other to know 
how to use and take advantage of those agreements and rules in practice. The present 
investigation seeks to conduct a detailed examination of the latter with a specific focus on 
critically examining public private partnership (PPP) strategies that can enable developing 
countries to effectively utilise the provisions of WTO DSU. To achieve this purpose, the 
article examines how Brazil, one of the most active DSU users among developing countries, 
has strengthened its DSU participation by engaging its private stakeholders during the 
management of WTO disputes. The identification and evaluation of the PPP strategies 
employed by the government and industries in Brazil may prompt other developing 
countries to determine their individual approach towards PPP for the handling of WTO 
disputes. 
                                                          
* Dr. Amrita Bahri, PhD in International Trade Law, University of Birmingham, UK; LLM in International 
Business Law, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. 
Assistant Professor of Law, Law Department, ITAM University, Mexico City. E-mail: 
amrita.bahri(at)itam.mx. The usual Disclaimer applies.  
Acknowledgments: A special thanks to Professor Gregory C. Shaffer, who has encouraged and guided me 
throughout this research. His scholarships on WTO dispute settlement and PPP are the key inspirations behind 
this research. A special appreciation and thanks to my Ph.D. supervisor Dr. Luca Rubini, who has been a 
tremendous mentor, advisor and guide. My words cannot express how grateful I am to the distinguished 
participants and interviewees who have made this research possible. In particular, I am thankful to Niall 
Meagher, Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, Harsha Vardhana Singh, Abhijit Das, Anant Swarup, Petros Mavroidis, 
Henry Gao, Lothar Ehring, Marco Bronckers, Erwan Berthelot, William Davey, Celso de Tarso Pereira, 
Eduardo Chikusa, Lu Xiankun and Toufiq Ali, as the invaluable insights gathered during their interviews have 
provided this research with a practical and diverse perspective.  
Article Published in Journal of World Trade 50:4 (Aug’16) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The WTO dispute settlement system is a remarkable example of international ‘rule of law’ 
and multilateral adjudication. WTO grants several rights to its Members, and WTO DSU 
provides a rule-oriented consultative and judicial mechanism to protect and enforce these 
rights in cases of WTO-incompatible trade infringements. It empowers its Member State to 
protect and expand its foreign market access by challenging foreign trade practices and 
defending its measures through a time-defined procedure of consultation, litigation and 
implementation.1 One of the key objectives of WTO DSU is to enhance a country’s overall 
economic growth and development, by reducing trade barriers and expanding foreign trade 
through multilateral regulation.2   
The WTO dispute settlement experience can enhance the Member States’ understanding 
and expertise in international trade law, which the governments can utilise in identifying 
WTO-incompatible foreign trade practices and invoking WTO DSU provisions. With the 
experience, expertise and confidence to ‘play with [WTO] rules’3, the governments can 
develop bargaining strategies which they can employ to amicably resolve (and diffuse) 
trade conflicts and thereby protect their industries’ trade interests in the ‘shadow of a 
potential WTO litigation’4.  
With better bargaining and litigation strategies, and with the consequentially enhanced 
capacity to raise credible litigation threats, Member States can improve their “terms-of-
trade” through effective negotiation with (or successful litigation against) other Member 
States. Favourable “terms-of-trade” can further generate wide economic, social and 
                                                          
1 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘Dispute Settlement 
Understanding’) (15 April 1995) LT/UR/A-2/DS/U/1. For more information, see World Trade Organization, 
Dispute Settlement: Legal Text <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm> accessed 5 May 
2015.   
2 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: What We Do 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_we_do_e.htm> accessed 6 May 2015. Gregory C 
Shaffer, ‘Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Why it Matters, the Barriers 
Posed, and its Impact on Bargaining’ (May 2005) ICTSD Research paper: Legal Capacity, 178 
<http://www.ictsd.org/themes/global-economic-governance/research/developing-country-use-of-the-wto-
dispute-settlement> accessed 15 September 2014 [The author notes that ‘the success of developing countries 
in WTO litigation (compared to under the GATT) appears to have increased in terms of gaining market 
access.’]  
3 Gregory C Shaffer, ‘How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: 
Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies’ (March 2003) ICTSD Resource Paper No 5 
<http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/dsu_2003.pdf> accessed 18 July 2012.  
4 Gallanter has called this process ‘litigotiation’. He describes it in the following words: ‘[T]he career of most 
cases does not lead to full-blown trial and adjudication but consists of negotiation and manoeuvre in the 
strategic pursuit of settlement through mobilization of the court process.’ [M Galanter, ‘Contract in court; or 
almost everything you may or may not want to know about contract litigation’ (2001) 3 Wisconsin Law 
Review 577, 579].  
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environmental benefits for its economic sectors and society at large.5 The overarching 
ambit of WTO dispute settlement is now encompassing areas beyond business, as Panels 
and Appellate Body have interpreted and clarified issues that go well beyond law and 
economics, such as those relating to strategic raw material6, green technology7, consumer 
welfare8, public health9 and purely social concerns10. Hence, one can understand how, 
against a limited legal representation by Member States, WTO DSM can generate far-
reaching economic and non-economic benefits for governments, businesses and other 
private entities. However, the DSU participation benefits come at a cost which may not be 
equally affordable by all WTO Members.  
With the more complex and rule-oriented system of WTO DSU, the Member States require 
higher relative capacity to use the adjudicatory mechanism than they required under the 
previous trading regime, i.e., they require more resources to monitor and enforce their 
international trade rights. Busch and Reinhardt observe that WTO Member States, in order 
to participate effectively at WTO DSU, require ‘experienced trade lawyers to litigate a 
case’, ‘seasoned politicians and bureaucrats to decide whether it is worth litigating a case’, 
‘staff to monitor trade practices abroad’, ‘domestic institutions necessary to participate in 
international negotiations’, and sufficient market power to ensure compliance and threaten 
retaliation in cases of non-compliance.11 This demand for greater resources has posed many 
participation challenges to developing countries at WTO DSM.12  
                                                          
5 Gallanter (n 4) 579.  
6 For example, see China - Raw Material [Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R, 
Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / 
WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3501]. 
7 Canada – Renewable Energy/ Canada - Feed-in Tariff case [Panel Reports, Canada – Certain Measures 
Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff 
Program, WT/DS412/R and Add.1 / WT/DS426/R and Add.1, adopted 24 May 2013, as modified by 
Appellate Body Reports WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R]. 
8 See, for example, US-Tuna case [Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012, DSR 
2012:IV, 1837] 
9 For example, see European Union and a Member State – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit cases 
[European Union and a Member State – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409, in consultations on 
12 May 2010; European Union and a Member State – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408, in 
consultations on 11 May 2010]. 
10 See, for example, the cases of US – Gambling [Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5797; Panel Report, United States – 
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services – Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/RW, adopted 22 May 2007, DSR 2007:VIII, p. 3105].  
11 Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Developing Countries’ 
(April 2004) Trade Brief, Swedish International Development and Cooperation Agency, 3-4 
<http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/mlb66/SIDA.pdf> accessed 15 November 2014.  
12 For a detailed analysis of participation challenges faced by developing countries at WTO DSU, see the 
following scholarships: Busch and Reinhardt, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Developing 
Countries’ (n 11); Chad P Bown and Bernard M Hoekman, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing 
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The developing countries have faced problems in monitoring foreign trade practices and 
identifying or investigating foreign trade barriers. They have struggled in negotiating a 
settlement or conducting successful bilateral or multilateral consultations. They have also 
faced obstacles in litigating trade barriers at WTO DSU. Moreover, on several noted 
occasions, developing countries have found it difficult to ensure compliance even after a 
favourable ruling has been given by the Panel or Appellate Body (AB).13 These challenges 
are “capacity-related”14 as they can largely be attributed to paucity of the legal knowledge, 
financial power and political influence, or ‘… more simply, of law, money, and politics.’15 
In light of this situation, it becomes pertinent to raise the following two questions: Can 
developing countries enhance their WTO dispute settlement capacity? If the answer to the 
first question is yes, which are the most cost-effective and viable options for addressing the 
capacity-related challenges?  
Broadly, there are two options that can be explored for addressing the capacity-related 
challenges. The first option is to introduce changes at the international level (which can 
include changing WTO rules).16 The second option is to find solutions at the domestic 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector’ (2005) 8(4) Journal of International Economic Law 
861; Jan Bohanes & Fernanda Garza, ‘Going Beyond Stereotypes: Participation of Developing Countries in 
WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2012) 4 (1) Trade Law and Development 45, 66-67; Michael Ewing-Chow, ‘Are 
Asian WTO Members Using the WTO DSU ‘Effectively’?’ (2013) 16(3) Journal of International Economic 
Law 669; Joseph Francis, Henrick Horn and Niklas Kaunitz, ‘Trading Profiles and Developing Countries 
Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System’ (December 2008) ICTSD Issue Paper No 6 
<http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/ICTSD_Francois_Trading-Profiles.pdf> accessed 21 
September 2014.   
13 Bohanes and Garza (n 12) 48; Ewing-Chow (n 12) 671.    
14 The term “capacity” in the article has a broad meaning as it includes a country’s political, legal and 
financial power, and it generally refers to a country’s overall ability to utilise the WTO dispute settlement 
provisions. [Niall Meagher, 'Representing Developing Countries before the WTO: The Role of the Advisory 
Centre on WTO Law (ACWL)', European University Institute, RSCAS Policy Paper 2015/02, 2 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/35747> accessed 15 May 2015]; Henrick Horn, Louise Johanneson and 
Petros C Mavroidis, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2010: Some Descriptive Statistics’ (2011) 
45(6) Journal of World Trade 1107, 1114. [It notes that WTO DSU participation is directly related to legal, 
informational and procedural capacity of developing countries.]  
15 Gregory C Shaffer, Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, ‘Does Legal Capacity Matter? A Survey of WTO 
Members’ (2009) 8 World Trade Review 559, 572.  
16 For instance, developing countries have proposed following changes to the multilateral rules of dispute 
settlement: 1. Introduction of retrospective and mandatory financial compensation and collective suspension 
of concession as effective remedies for enforcement of awards. {World Trade Organization, Dispute 
Settlement Body, Special Session, ‘Text for the African Group Proposals on Dispute Settlement 
Understanding Negotiations’ submitted by Kenya in the name of African Group [TN/DS/W/42]. 24 January 
2003; World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Body, Special Session, ‘Text for LDC Proposal on 
Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations’ submitted by Haiti in the name of LDC [TN/DS/W/37] 22 
January 2003}; 2. The creation of a fast track and simplified procedure of adjudication for cases with 
established precedents. {World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Body, Special Session, ‘Responses to 
Questions on the Specific Input from China’ submitted by China [TN/DS/W/57] 19 May 2003; World Trade 
Organization, Dispute Settlement Body, Special Session, ‘Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding’ submitted by Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe [TN/DS/W/19] 9 October 2002}; 3. The creation of a WTO Fund which can provide them with 
financial assistance during the conduct of dispute settlement proceedings {World Trade Organization, Dispute 
Settlement Body, Special Session, ‘Text for the African Group Proposals on Dispute Settlement 
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level.17 The study centers its focus on the second option because of the following two 
reasons:   
First, it is difficult to dispute that most of the DSU participation challenges faced by 
developing countries are deeply rooted in the domestic context of these countries and 
therefore solutions can best be found at the domestic level. For example, paucity of lawyers 
and government officials trained and experienced in WTO law can, to some extent, be 
blamed for high litigation costs as the lack of domestic legal expertise necessitates hiring 
expensive overseas lawyers.18 Paucity of information and evidential documents with a 
complaining or responding government is mainly due to lack of inter-ministerial 
coordination and disengaged private stakeholders, and it sometimes results in increasing the 
litigation cost as data is purchased from overseas agencies.19 Second, litigation of a dispute 
at WTO DSU is largely dependent on how that dispute is handled at the domestic level. For 
example, a case that is poorly handled (perhaps because the impugned trade barrier is 
insufficiently investigated or the arguments are not examined by experienced litigators or 
the claims are poorly substantiated) at the domestic level generally stands a relatively lower 
chance of success at the international level.20 Hence, in practice, the future of WTO 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Understanding Negotiations’ submitted by Kenya in the name of African Group [TN/DS/W/42] 24 January 
2003}; 4. The strengthening of special and differential treatment provisions in order to make them precise, 
effective and operational {World Trade Organization, General Council, ‘Preparation for the Fourth Session of 
the Ministerial Conference’ [WT/GC/W/442] 19 September 2001}.  
17 There are many advocates of this approach. Some prominent scholars have proposed the following 
strategies: 1. Creation of legal service centres, law schools, pro bono work by law firms, consumer 
organizations and development organizations [Bown and Hoekman, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and the 
Missing Developing Country Cases’ (n 12)]; 2. Engagement of private sector for identifying and challenging 
trade barriers, increased third party participation at WTO DSU, creation of information-sharing channels 
between government departments and between government and industry, organized private sector community, 
reorganization of governmental structures and creation of coordination procedures [Bohanes and Garza (n 12) 
79-88]; 3. Creation of domestic procedures and institutions for the management of WTO disputes [Ewing-
Chow (n 12)]; 4. Establishment of inter-ministerial framework of governance and dedicated WTO dispute 
settlement unit within the appropriate government department [in Gregory C Shaffer and Ricardo Melendez-
Ortiz (eds), Dispute Settlement at the WTO: The Developing Countries Experience (Cambridge University 
Press 2010) 345].  
18 Interview with Moushami Joshi, Luthra and Luthra (Delhi, India, 21 June 2013). [Interviewee observes the 
following: ‘With more number of cases being litigated by and against India mainly from the year 2001, the 
government has decided to expand its legal expertise. It is not feasible and economically viable to hire 
expensive Geneva based lawyers, especially in the cases where India is challenged. The government therefore 
has started to rely more on domestic expertise for cutting down the high litigation cost.’] 
19 In EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Thailand), the sugar industries in Brazil, Australia and Thailand jointly 
purchased the evidential data from LMC International for substantiating and updating their litigation briefs 
and responses. [Panel Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, Complaint by Thailand, 
WT/DS283/R, adopted 19 May 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS265/AB/R, 
WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, DSR 2005:XIV, 7071]. ACWL, ‘The ACWL at Ten: Looking Back, 
Looking Forward’ (WTO Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, 4 October 2011) 25.  
<http://www.acwl.ch/e/documents/reports/ACWL%20AT%20TEN.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013. 
20 Marie WILKE, ‘Practical Considerations in Managing Trade Disputes’ (December 2012) ICTSD 
Information Note 11, at 1 <http://ictsd.org/downloads/2013/02/practical-considerations-in-managing-trade-
disputes.pdf> accessed 27 September 2013. [The author notes that ‘…countries can take advantage of the rule 
of law only if they can effectively pursue their rights in this complex legal regime, which largely depends on 
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litigation is partially predetermined by the manner in which it is handled at the domestic 
level. On the basis of these arguments, the study argues that the capacity constraints should 
directly be dealt with at the domestic level, and therefore it is essential for developing 
countries to develop domestic strategies for information-gathering, monitoring, 
consultation, litigation and enforcement of awards.  
This study investigates and analyses, through the dispute settlement experience of Brazil, 
the above-mentioned capacity-building option which calls for developing in-house 
strategies for international dispute settlement. With the help of Brazil’s case study, the 
article examines multiple domestic capacity-enhancing strategies including the inter-
ministerial handling of foreign trade disputes, creation of dedicated laws, institutions and 
procedures to manage WTO disputes, creation of in-house monitoring capacity with the 
help of voluntary sector and local law firms, and government-industry coordination during 
the management of disputes. However, the study focuses particularly on the last mentioned 
strategy, i.e., government-industry coordination.  
In essence, exporters and importers are the real beneficiaries and victims of international 
trade regulation and multilateral dispute settlement, and it is, in practice, the regulation of 
their business conduct and conflicts which gives rise to the burgeoning jurisprudence on 
international trade law.21 Every trade disagreement which grows into a formal legal action 
at WTO DSU (if not resolved or diffused by way of negotiations or consultations) generally 
emanates from cross-border commercial transactions between exporters and importers or 
business entities and public sector authorities.22 Moreover, exporters and importers can 
generally gather information, evidence and documents concerning foreign trade measures 
and their impact during the course of conducting their everyday business activities.23 
Hence, some coordination between government and industry, in most cases, is embedded in 
the nature of WTO dispute settlement proceedings.  
The engagement of affected industries during the management of trade disputes is a ‘crucial 
enabling element’ for any government action that is undertaken to safeguard or expand 
business interests. This argument is based on the hypothesis that an effective partnership 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
having an adequate number of experienced legal, economic, and diplomatic staff and a well informed and 
active private sector.’] 
21 ‘Although private business operators do not have access to the WTO DSU, they are the ones who are most 
likely to be affected by the inefficiencies of the system.’ [Edwini Kessie, ‘Enhancing Security and 
Predictability for private Business Operators under the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO’ (2000) 34(6) 
Journal of World Trade 1, 17. Presently derived from Alberto Alemanno, ‘Private parties and WTO Dispute 
Settlement System’ (2004) Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers, Paper 
1, at 4 <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/1> accessed 2 October 2012.].  
22 Robert Echandi, ‘How to Successfully Manage Conflicts and Prevent Dispute Adjudication in International 
Trade’ (2013) ICTSD Issue Paper No 11, at 2, 3 <http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/04/how-to-
successfully-manage-conflicts-and-prevent-dispute-adjudication-in-international-trade.pdf> accessed 22 
September 2014. 
23 Gene M Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Special Interest Politics (The MIT Press 2001) 4.  
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arrangement between government and industry can cost-effectively enhance the dispute 
settlement capacity of developing countries. To examine and establish this hypothesis, the 
article focuses on Brazil’s dispute settlement partnership experience as it seeks to examine 
three specific issues: first, how can dispute settlement partnerships play a capacity-
enhancing role in developing countries; second, how a particular government in a 
developing country can coordinate with the affected private stakeholders during the 
handling of foreign trade disputes; third, what problems, if any, can the government face in 
doing the same. Selection of Brazil, as against other developing Member States, for the 
purpose of this investigation can be justified on the basis of following three reasons:  
First, Brazil has emerged as a global leader in international trade.24 As a part of major 
trading alliances including WTO, MERCOSUR25, G-2026, Cairns Group27 and BRIC28, it 
has played a significant role in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. It has also 
dedicated a significant amount of resources to WTO-related affairs including dispute 
settlement. After the US, the EU and Canada, Brazil is the fourth most active complainant 
at WTO DSM, making it the most frequent complainant among developing country 
Members of WTO.29 From the years 1995 to 2015, it has in different capacities participated 
in 137 cases out of 496 cases filed at WTO DSU during this period. Hence, it has 
participated, in one way or the other, in over 27 percent of the cases filed at WTO.30 Brazil 
has gained international repute not only for the quantity but also for the quality of its 
participation at WTO DSU.31 The nature and extent of its participation in international trade 
and international trade adjudication exhibits its continuing commitment towards expanding 
its in-house ability to further utilise WTO DSU provisions.  
Second, Brazil has made significant progress in overcoming the participation challenges, as 
it has learnt to utilise WTO DSM more effectively than other WTO Members from the 
                                                          
24 Brazil has established itself as the seventh largest economy in the world and the largest economy in the 
South America and also Latin America. It is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, and the credit 
largely goes to its export potential. Its gross domestic product has increased by six times from the year 1992 
to 2012. This has mainly been caused by increase in exports. It is one of the world's largest exporters of iron 
ore. [The World Bank Database 2015]  
25 It is a regional trading bloc in South America. For more information, see MERCOSUR 
<http://www.mercosur.int/> accessed 8 July 2015.  
26 It is an international alliance of economies that collectively accounts for almost eighty percent of world 
trade. For more information on G-20, see John J. Kirton, G20 Governance for a Globalised World (Ashgate 
2013) 1.  
27 It is a coalition of agricultural exporting countries. For details, see The Cairns Group 
<http://cairnsgroup.org/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 8 July 2015.  
28 It is a trading alliance of major emerging market economies. For more information, see The BRICS Post 
<http://thebricspost.com> accessed 10 November 2014.  
29 The WTO Database 2015.  
30 The data includes the cases filed from January 1995 to June 2015.  
31 Archana Jatkar & Laura McFarlene, 'Brazil in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: A Perspective' 
(2013) 1 Briefing Paper, Cuts International, at 1 
<http:///C:/Users/Amrita/Downloads/Briefing_Paper13Brazil_in_the_WTO_Dispute_Settlement_Understandi
ng-A_Perspective.pdf> accessed 10 July 2015. 
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developing world. At the same time, it is important to note that Brazil too has faced various 
participation challenges at WTO DSM. For example, in the year 1999, Canada – Aircraft32 
and Brazil - Aircraft33 disputes exhibited the emergent need to expand the dispute 
settlement capacity in Brazil. During these disputes, the government realised that an 
institutional reorganisation, additional financial and information resources and legal 
expertise were required for the successful WTO litigation and compliance proceedings.34 
However, following these disputes, the Brazilian management of trade disputes has 
undergone a significant transition, and hence, an investigation of its dispute settlement 
approach can provide useful lessons to its peers, i.e., other developing country users of 
WTO DSU.  
Third, Brazil has actively coordinated with industries with the help of a specialised 
institutional procedure established for the management of foreign trade disputes.35 Due to 
the nature of its political economy and institutionalised partnership strategies, it has become 
one of the most active developing country users of dispute settlement partnership approach. 
Hence, from a legal realist's perspective, it will be useful to assess Brazil’s relevant 
experience to provide practical insights to other developing countries. With the wealth of 
Brazil’s dispute settlement and private sector participation experience, the present study can 
usefully review and analyse the characteristics, weaknesses and the capacity-building 
potential of PPP approach.  
The article, in the following section, provides a brief overview of the political economy of 
Brazil as it is important to understand the nature of dispute settlement strategies, in 
particular, the nature of dispute settlement partnerships in the light of the country’s 
domestic conditions. It further provides a brief description of the Brazilian institutions and 
procedures involved in the overall management of foreign trade disputes. Following this, 
the article in section 3 analyses the ways in which several trade disputes were managed by 
the government and the private sector in Brazil. This enables the study to analyse, from a 
practical point of view, the characteristics and limitations of Brazilian dispute settlement 
partnership strategies. In section 4, the article provides a further analysis of the features of 
the Brazilian PPP mechanism which have enabled this developing country to overcome its 
WTO capacity-related challenges. It also examines certain limitations of the 
institutionalised mechanism of PPP in Brazil. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.  
                                                          
32 Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, adopted 
20 August 1999, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS70/AB/R, DSR 1999:IV, 1443. 
33 Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R, adopted 20 August 1999, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS46/AB/R, DSR 1999:III, 1221. 
34 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the WTO (Geneva, Switzerland, 16 
September 2013). 
35 For further details, see Section 2 and 3.  
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2. THE MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN TRADE DISPUTES IN BRAZIL 
Brazil enjoys a presidential representative democracy with a multiparty system of 
governance. It is run by a federal government, along with multiple states, federal districts 
and municipalities. However, it is important to note that Brazil, before becoming a 
democracy, followed an authoritarian form of governance with a largely state-owned or 
state-controlled economic sector. In the past three decades, it has undergone a huge 
transition from an authoritarian to a democratic nation. Although it has moved from a 
closed and protected economy to an open market economy with a capitalistic set-up, the 
remnants of its pre-1990s socialistic framework and its ‘Import Substitution 
Industrialisation’ policy are still visible in the existing regulations governing international 
trade.36 The Brazilian Government continues to control many strategic sectors of the 
economy including power generation and telecommunications. Very complex and detailed 
set of rules still govern the registration and operation of businesses.37 However, at the same 
time, the left-wing Governments (which have led the country since 2003 and were 
originally known for their state interventionist and nationalist policies) have used 
‘privatisation’ and ‘deregulation’ as tools to move towards a moderately free market 
economy.38  
Brazil has expanded its economy through international trade activities pursued mostly by 
private business entities, while the government has retained some powers to regulate 
foreign trade to achieve the ends of overall development and national welfare.39 This shift 
from the ‘Import Substitution Industrialisation’ policy to ‘export-oriented’ trade-liberalising 
policies, which coincided with the establishment of WTO in 1990s, created new challenges 
                                                          
36 ‘Import Substitution Industrialisation’ (ISI) was the cornerstone economic policy of the country since 
1930s. Its aim was to protect the domestic industry through local production of high value goods and services 
and reduction of importation. It was facilitated through state-owned industries, infrastructure investment and 
subsidies granted to domestic firms. For details on ISI and Brazil’s socialism, see Carlos Pio, ‘Brazil: Political 
and Economic Lessons from Democratic Transitions’ (June 2013) Civil Society, Markets and Democratic 
Initiatives, 1 
<http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/images/csmd_ebook/PathwaystoFreedom/ChapterPreviews/PathwaystoF
reedomBrazilPreview.pdf> accessed 9 July 2015.  
37 For example, the Labor Laws regulate the operation of businesses in Brazil as they seek to protect the 
welfare of workers. [Consolidated Labor Laws (CLT) Decree-law 5452 (1943) arts 578 and 591]. Also see the 
Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, arts 7 and 8.  
38 Pio (n 36) 4.   
39 World Trade Organization, ‘Trade Policy Review-Brazil’, Report of the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/140 (1 
November 2004), pp. 19, 37 [as cited in Gregory C Shaffer, Michelle Raton Sanchez Badin and Barbara 
Rosenberg, ‘Winning at the WTO: the Development of a Trade Policy Community Within Brazil’ in Gregory 
C Shaffer and Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz (eds), Dispute Settlement at the WTO: The Developing Countries 
Experience (Cambridge University Press 2010) 27]. Jatkar (n 31) 2 [' These shifts highlight the reliance Brazil 
placed on the global markets and the usage of the private sector to increase economic growth, which 
ultimately led it to be a leader of developing countries in front of the WTO  DSU.'] 
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and opportunities for the country.40 In response to these changes, the government 
underwent a massive reorganisation.  In particular, to respond to the demands of 
multilateral trade obligations after the establishment of WTO, and more particularly, to 
manage foreign trade disputes under the rule-oriented WTO DSM, Brazil established a 
specialised ‘three pillar’ dispute settlement mechanism.  
Shaffer’s work indicates that the Brazilian ‘three pillar’ dispute settlement mechanism 
‘consists of a specialized WTO dispute settlement division located in the capital, Brasilia 
(the "first pillar"), coordination between this unit and Brazil's WTO mission in Geneva (the 
"second pillar"), and coordination between both of these entities and Brazil's private sector, 
as well as law firms and economic consultants funded by the private sector (the "third 
pillar")’.41 Coordination between these three pillars has better enabled the government to 
manage trade disputes with the help of public private coordination.42 A more detailed and 
comprehensive illustration of this institutional framework is provided in the figure below.  
 
                                                          
40 Jatkar (n 31) 2 ['Brazil’s emergence as a powerhouse at the WTO and especially within the DSU is often 
attributed to the economic and political changes in Brazil in the late 1980s through the early 1990s. During 
that time, Brazil moved from import substitution industrialisation polices towards export-oriented trade 
liberalising alternatives, which was, at the same time, that liberalised trade relations were institutionalised at 
the WTO.'] 
41 Gregory C Shaffer, Michelle Raton Sanchez Badin and Barbara Rosenberg, ‘The Trials of Winning at the 
WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil's Success’ (2008) 41(2) Cornell International Law Journal 383, 423. Findings 
further confirmed in interviews with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34) and Eduardo Chikusa, Permanent Mission 
of Brazil to the WTO (Geneva, Switzerland, 16 September 2013).  
42 Bown and Hoekman, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases’ (n 12). 
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Figure 1: Institutional Framework in Brazil 
The figure above identifies the Brazilian public and private sector participants that are 
currently engaged in the overall management of WTO disputes. A brief discussion of their 
functions and dispute settlement procedures is provided below.43 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since pre-WTO era, has been responsible for managing 
international trade matters, as the ‘Union’ (which is the official name for the Federal 
Government) in Brazil is responsible for all international affairs.44 The Ministry’s long 
standing interest and expertise accumulated over the past decades in international trade are 
                                                          
43 Detailed procedural analysis in Shaffer, Badin and Rosenberg (n 41) 429-432; Also see PDM Veiga, ‘Trade 
policy-making in Brazil: Changing patterns in State-civil society relationship’ in Mark Halle and Robert 
Wolfe (eds), Process Matters: Sustainable Development and Domestic Trade Transparency (Geneva, IISD 
2007) 143, 178; findings further confirmed in interviews with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34) and Eduardo 
Chikusa (n 41).  
44 The Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, art 21.  
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the main reasons behind its continued central position in WTO matters including dispute 
settlement. A specialised dispute settlement unit, known as the ‘General Coordination of 
Disputes’ (CGC)45, is established under the Ministry for seeking coordination with the 
private sector, initial examination of disputes, and presentation of cases at WTO DSM. The 
private sector in Brazil assists CGC during various stages of dispute settlement, mainly 
with the help of trade associations, consultancies and law firms.46  
The dispute settlement process is most commonly initiated when a company, either through 
its trade association or on its own, approaches the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (or its subject-specific Ministry) to convey or informally 
discuss a trade barrier.47 Companies and trade associations, with the passage of time, have 
realised the importance of approaching the government with a well-researched and 
documented application (or legal memorandum) to request a governmental action in a 
matter. The private sector in Brazil has also frequently hired foreign and domestic lawyers 
for the preparation of such applications and investigation of trade barriers.48 This practice 
of filing well-documented and supported applications by affected private stakeholders and 
the government’s initiation of investigation upon receiving such complaints draws 
similarities between the Brazilian PPP arrangements and the ones formed between the 
European Commission and the affected European businesses with the help of a formal 
mechanism known as “Trade Barrier Regulation (TBR)”.49   
On administering a complaint from the private sector, or on identifying a barrier suo moto, 
CGC conducts an initial examination of the legal and economic viability of pursuing a 
dispute. Based on the findings of preliminary examination, CGC refers the dispute to the 
concerned unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to other concerned Ministries, 
such as the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade, Agriculture, or others.50 It is at this 
stage that the concerned Ministries carry out a detailed investigation, wherein they further 
examine the legal, economic and political viability of pursuing the dispute. They prepare an 
investigation report, along with their recommendations and relevant information, which is 
                                                          
45 Unit for General Coordination of Disputes, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil 
<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/temas-multilaterais/desenvolvimento-comercio-internacional-e-
financas/organizacao-mundial-do-comercio/solucao-de-controversias/cgc> accessed 15 October 2012.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34). 
48 Ibid. 
49 The mechanism provides a right to European businesses to petition the European Commission if their trade 
interests are infringed. Trade Barrier Regulation (TBR) mechanism is provided in Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 3286/94 [22 December 1994] amended by Council Regulation No. 356/95 [20 February 1995] and 
Council Regulation No. 125/2008 [12 February 2008] and EU Regulation No. 654/2014 of 15 May 2014 
(laying down Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the 
exercise of the Community's rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the 
auspices of the World Trade Organization) [1994] OJ L349 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1994R3286:20080305:EN:PDF> accessed 24 
October 2012. 
50 Confirmed in interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34). 
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subsequently forwarded to an inter-ministerial department known as the Inter-Ministerial 
Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX)51. Based on the recommendations provided by the 
Ministries, and on the basis of its political-diplomatic analysis of the situation, CAMEX 
formally decides whether the government should pursue the dispute bilaterally or 
multilaterally. If formal dispute settlement procedures are invoked, it decides the course of 
action required at the pre-litigation, litigation and post-litigation stages of a dispute.52 
Once CAMEX decides to pursue a dispute, CGC becomes obliged to launch consultation 
with the offending Member State(s), and if required, to prepare and present a given case at 
the WTO.53 From this stage onwards, CGC officials work closely with the private counsels 
(frequently hired by the industry) and the concerned private sector representatives. 
Moreover, it ‘encourages companies to hire counsel’ and it often has ‘conditioned the 
pursuit’ of filing a WTO complaint on the private sector’s willingness to finance the 
counsels fee.54 It also shares updates and information about the settlement of disputes with 
the concerned Ministries and the officials at its Permanent Mission to the WTO.55 
Therefore, it can be argued that CGC serves as a contact point among the government, the 
Permanent Mission of Brazil to the WTO, participating business entities and private 
counsels hired in a case.  
CAMEX is constituted under the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, 
along with several other Ministries.56 It interlinks these Departments and coordinates issues 
relating to trade (including the settlement of foreign trade disputes) among different 
government departments. This inter-ministerial approach allows the Brazilian government 
to act in a concerted, integrated and informed manner. An institutional link between the 
ministries, CAMEX and business community is provided with the establishment of the 
Private Sector Consultative Council (CONEX), a unit which is situated within CAMEX. It 
comprises around 20 private sector representatives which mainly focus on trade policy 
issues for export promotion. CONEX gathers required information and evidence from the 
concerned business entities during various stages of dispute settlement.57 This development 
is similar to the EU’s creation of the Market Access Advisory Committee, which provides 
                                                          
51 CAMEX is the counselling chamber of the Government, and it is also known as the Foreign Trade 
Chamber. It is a part of Government Council of the Presidency. It comprises several government departments 
and is assisted by a common secretariat. For more information, see Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Foreign Trade, CAMEX <http://www.mdic.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=1&menu=1920> accessed 
24 August 2012.  
52 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34). 
53 Interview with Eduardo Chikusa (n 41). 
54 Shaffer, Badin and Rosenberg (n 41) 431. 
55 Ibid; Interview with Eduardo Chikusa (n 41). 
56 Other ministries are: Ministry of State Chief of Staff; Foreign Affairs; Farm, Agriculture, Livestock and 
Supply; Planning, Budget and Management; Land Development. 
57 World Trade Organisation, ‘Trade Policy Review: Brazil’ Report of the Secretariat [WT/TPR/S/140] 1 
November 2004, 19, 37 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp239_e.htm> accessed 06 July 2012.   
Article Published in Journal of World Trade 50:4 (Aug’16) 
 
an institutional interface between the EU Commission and the business community in 
Europe.58 
The private sector in Brazil has further organised itself with the help of well-funded trade 
associations and large individual companies. This has enabled the industries to strongly 
partner their government during investigation of barriers or litigation of disputes at WTO. 
The emergence of strong trade associations is an exemplary development which is closely 
supported by Brazilian Constitution. The Brazilian Constitution and the Consolidated Labor 
Laws contain various favourable provisions to support the functioning of trade associations. 
For example, they provide for an annual tax which is mandatorily levied on the employers; 
the tax is known as ‘Union Contributions’.59 The union contributions are distributed among 
trade associations and confederations with the purpose of funding their representative 
activities. Ben Scheider confirms that ‘over time the statutory provisions for financing 
compulsory associations bankrolled some of the wealthiest business associations in Latin 
America’, and as a result, the associations have been able to accumulate massive 
resources.60  
Think tanks and research centres in Brazil also play an important role in international trade 
matters and dispute settlement. Some of them have been created by entrepreneurs for 
advising, informing and assisting the government and industry on various trade issues. For 
instance, one of the leading think tanks in Brazil is the Institute of Studies on Trade and 
International Negotiations (ICONE).61 It provides technical analysis and research support 
relating to agriculture and agribusiness to the government and the agriculture industry. 
Some of the think tanks are directly linked to universities and are run by academics. For 
example, the Brazilian Center of International Relations (CEBRI)62 is a non-profit based 
think tank which seeks to ‘foster dialogue between different actors, public and private…’.63 
It is mainly engaged in sponsoring research programs, commissioning studies on 
international issues, and organizing roundtables, symposia and debates. It is also interesting 
                                                          
58 The European Commission has established the Market Access Advisory Committee to supervise the forums 
where Member States, Commission officials and the EU business actors will regularly meet and coordinate 
their efforts. For further details, see European Commission DG-Trade, ‘Final Report: Interim Evaluation of 
the European Union’s Trade Barrier Regulation (TBR)’ (June 2005) 18 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/october/tradoc_125451.pdf> accessed 25 September 2014. 
59 It is provided in Consolidated Labor Laws (CLT) Decree-law 5452 (1943), arts 578 and 591; Constitution 
of Brazil, art 8. For details, see CNI: Contributions from Industry 
<http://www.cni.org.br/portal/data/pages/FF80808121B629230121B62A6BCF0345.htm> accessed 22 
October 2013.  
60 S Haggard, S Maxfield and B R  Schneider, ‘Theories of Business and Business-State Relations’ in S 
Maxfield and B R Schneider (eds.), Business and the State in Developing Countries (Cornell University Press 
1997) 36, 45.  
61 For details, see ICONE <http://www.iconebrasil.org.br/> accessed 25 June 2013.  
62 For details, see CEBRI: About Us <http://www.cebri.org/cebri/materia/sobre-o-cebri/quem-
somos;jsessionid=157430DDD57D874A1191703CF0433754#.UmkiJ3C3_fI> accessed 23 October 2013.  
63 Ibid; Shaffer, Badin and Rosenberg (n 41) 452 [The authors note that CEBRI has been founded by a ‘group 
of intellectuals, businessmen, government authorities, and academics’.] 
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to note that the Center is fully sponsored by exporting companies, trade associations and 
private law firms in Brazil. 
Think tanks, trade associations and law firms have introduced several internship 
opportunities for students, trade lawyers, private sector and government officials. These 
internships are offered at various locations.64 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 
association with the Law Firm Study Center, offers a four month internship program at the 
Brazilian Permanent Mission to the WTO to private lawyers, government officials and to 
the officials from trade associations.65 Similar internship programs have been introduced by 
the Dispute Settlement Unit, the National Missions at Geneva and Washington DC, various 
government departments and prominent consultancies and research centres in Brazil.66 
These internships have enabled law students and professionals to gain experience and 
expertise in WTO laws. The growth of interns and young professionals has in turn assisted 
the private sector and the government to conduct disputes in a cost-effective manner as they 
have gained enhanced access to legally marshalled information and evidence at a 
comparatively affordable rate.67 This trend has further increased the enthusiasm and 
demand for courses in international economic law at universities, leading to an overall 
enhanced trade law expertise and awareness in the country. 
Finally, the growing interest of the Brazilian media in international trade affairs has served 
as an important information interface between the government, business community, 
academia, think tanks, law firms and other interested parties. As journalists in Brazil are 
increasingly being trained in WTO-related aspects, their enhanced understanding of trade 
issues has resulted in effective and intelligible reporting of WTO-related issues.68 This 
development suggests that national media can play an instrumental role in the enhancement 
                                                          
64 For example, they are offered at its Permanent WTO Mission, at the Brazilian embassy at Washington DC 
and at the Brasilia Dispute Settlement Unit. 
65 Interview with an official, Government of Brazil [Name and details withheld]. 
66 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34) [The interviewee confirms the following: ‘The Permanent 
Mission of Brazil at Geneva had organised an internship program in the year 1994 with more than 200 
participating lawyers. Most of these lawyers, after the internship program, returned to Brazil and served 
industries and the government. Therefore, it has gradually become easier for the government to analyse 
private claims and disputes. The provision of internships has also helped our industries in approaching these 
trained lawyers to investigate barriers and prepare applications for registering their trade grievances with the 
government.’]   
67 Interview with an official, Government of Brazil [Name and details withheld]; Shaffer, Badin and 
Rosenberg, ‘Winning at the WTO’ (n 41) 54-55 [Authors note that interns were hired by the industries in the 
EC-Bananas arbitration hearings and the Brazil-Tyres Panel hearings.]   
68 Foreign trade disagreements and potential and ongoing WTO disputes are extensively covered and analysed 
by media nowadays. See, for example, ‘EU Violates WTO Rules With Out-Of-Quota Sugar Exports, Say 
UNICA’ UNICA News (17 December 2011) <http://www.unica.com.br/news/7064751920334804993/eu-
violates-wto-rules-with-out-of-quota-sugar-exports-por-cento2C-says-unica/> accessed 12 June 2014; 
‘Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association Calls on European Commission Not to Authorize Sugar Exports 
Above WTO Ceiling’ 7KPLCtv.com (Sao Paulo, 25 January 2014) 
<http://www.kplctv.com/story/11878241/brazilian-sugarcane-industry-association-calls-on-european-
commission-not-to-authorize-sugar-exports-above-wto-ceiling> accessed 13 June 2014.  
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of WTO-related awareness and information dissemination in a developing country. An 
educated and free media can also discharge watchdog functions by monitoring the activities 
of the government and the interaction between the public and private sector entities. In 
particular, the importance of media in managing WTO matters can mainly be realised in 
democratic countries where democratically elected governments are particularly responsive 
to the needs of individuals and they seek to achieve public support and, hence, political 
advantage through media reports. 
The democratic nature of governance, an organized export-oriented economic climate and 
the specialised public and private sector institutions in Brazil have triggered the formation 
of public-private alliances during the management of WTO disputes. The following section, 
with the help of selected WTO cases, analyses the nature and characteristics of these 
dispute settlement partnerships formed in Brazil. 
3. PUBLIC PRIVATE COORDINATION: ANALYSIS OF SELECTED 
TRADE DISPUTES 
This section introduces and analyses four WTO disputes that were conducted through 
varied forms of coordination between the government and private stakeholders in Brazil. 
With the help of these cases, the section analyses the manner in which the public and 
private sector agencies have coordinated in WTO disputes, and the extent to which they 
have acted in accordance with the above-mentioned institutional and procedural 
frameworks established for dispute settlement coordination. The primary purpose of this 
analysis is to identify those characteristics of PPP strategies that have introduced 
effectiveness into the overall management of foreign trade disputes in Brazil. The 
effectiveness or success of government-industry coordination, in the context of this article, 
will not be measured in terms of the nature and extent of resources exchanged between the 
partners, or the extent to which an industry has financed a dispute. A PPP strategy will be 
effective and advantageous if it can strengthen the countries’ WTO dispute settlement 
capacity. 
3.1 The Aircraft cases 
As mentioned earlier, the Canada – Aircraft69 and Brazil - Aircraft70 cases were a wake-up 
call for the Government of Brazil as they outlined the need to expand its domestic dispute 
                                                          
69 Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, adopted 
20 August 1999, upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/DS70/AB/R, DSR 1999:IV, 1443. 
70 Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R, adopted 20 August 1999, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS46/AB/R, DSR 1999:III, 1221. 
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settlement capacity.71 These disputes are significant as they have changed the outlook and 
approach of the government towards the handling of WTO disputes. These cases illustrate 
the potential role that can be played by the affected industries in WTO litigation, and 
therefore, the capacity building potential of PPP mechanism.  
These challenges were initiated by Canada and Brazil (against each other) to protect the 
interests of their respective aircraft industries.72 Canada, in the Brazil – Aircraft case, 
challenged the export subsidies granted to foreign purchasers of Embraer aircraft with the 
contention that these subsidies were inconsistent with the Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM) Agreement.73 The pursuit was shortly followed by a similar challenge 
from Brazil in Canada – Aircraft case, against certain subsidies which were granted by the 
Government of Canada to support their export of civilian aircraft. Brazil also contended 
that these measures were inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. The Panel and Appellate 
Body in these cases substantially upheld the challenges and found that both Brazil and 
Canada were acting in violation of their commitments under the SCM Agreement.74 
The private and public sector entities in Brazil had overlapping interests in 
litigating/defending these disputes. Embraer was seeking the removal of subsidies granted 
to its competitor so that it could maintain a profitable business of manufacturing and 
exporting aircrafts. For the Government of Brazil, successful litigation of the case against 
Canada and strong defensiveness to the challenge from Canada were important for political, 
economic and symbolic reasons.75 Embraer, a state-owned company until 1994, was 
privatised during the period when many state-owned enterprises in Brazil were being 
privatised. Shortly after its privatisation, Embraer started emerging as a leading aircraft 
provider (for commercial, corporate and military use) in the international market. Brazil 
therefore had an important technological sector to protect as it was preparing itself for 
international competition.  
During the two aircraft disputes, the strategies and nature of partnership formed between 
the government and the aircraft industry in Brazil were very similar. Foreign-based lawyers 
and economic consultants in these disputes were hired by Embraer. The Permanent Mission 
of Brazil to the WTO worked closely with the privately-hired lawyers and economic 
consultants during the litigation and post-litigation stages of the disputes. Moreover, the 
privately hired lawyers, for the first time, were allowed to join the national delegation and 
                                                          
71 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34). 
72 The leading exporter of aircraft in Canada was Bombardier and in Brazil was Embraer. It has therefore been 
argued that the aircraft disputes were largely initiated to protect the special exporting interests of these two 
companies.  
73 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/9 arts 3, 27, 27.4, 
27.5. 
74 For details, see WTO, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS46 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds46_e.htm> accessed 28 October 2013; Dispute 
DS70 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds70_e.htm> accessed 29 October 2013.   
75 Jatkar (n 31) 2. 
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participate directly in the WTO adjudicatory proceedings. Hence, unlike earlier cases where 
only diplomats were allowed to present and respond to legal arguments, the present cases 
witnessed a new era where private lawyers were presenting the cases at the formal WTO 
hearings. The private lawyers were closely monitored and guided by the government 
officials. Moreover, the company representatives supervised and assisted the private and 
the government lawyers through regular meetings and phone calls.76 Therefore, these cases 
could aptly be seen as a turning point as the government arguably began to delegate the 
WTO litigation work to private sector entities.  
The gradual delegation of functions from government officials to privately-hired service 
providers, accompanied by transfer of resources from the private company (Embraer) to the 
government, resulted in the evolution of PPP in Brazil. However, the smooth interaction in 
this case should be seen with a caveat, i.e., the company was originally state-owned and the 
government, after the company’s privatisation, continued to retain some control in its 
functioning. This meant that the officers in control of the company were either public 
officials or private officials working under close supervision and guidance of the public 
officials. This state of affairs resulted in open channels of communication, and resultantly, a 
relationship of confidence between the government and company officials. Hence, the case 
suggests that smooth conduct of dispute settlement procedures requires a relationship of 
confidence and trust between government and industry, and this can possibly be established 
if there are effective channels of communication and information between the two.  
Finally, the case outlines that the privately-owned resources were utilised by the 
government to successfully protect its WTO rights. The constitutional and diplomatic 
authority of the government was indirectly invoked by the profit-motivated industry 
through a privately-funded governmental action at the WTO. At stake were the exporting 
and national interests of the industry and the government, and they were dependent on each 
other’s resources for the protection of their respective overlapping interests. Their 
respective interests were protected with the help of a reciprocal exchange of resources 
through an ad-hoc partnership formed between the two. This arrangement indicates that the 
WTO dispute settlement partnerships are generally based on resource-exchange, reciprocity 
and interdependency between the government and industries.  
3.2 EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar (Brazil) 
The EC — Export Subsidies on Sugar (Brazil)77 provides another striking example of 
coordination between the CGC, the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the WTO, the sugar 
industry, lawyers and economic consultants in Brazil. In this case, Brazil challenged the 
                                                          
76 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34). 
77 Panel Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, Complaint by Brazil, WT/DS266/R, 
adopted 19 May 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, 
WT/DS283/AB/R, DSR 2005:XIV, 6793. 
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EC’s provision of export subsidies to its sugar industry. Brazil alleged that the EC’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (under Council Regulation78) was providing subsidies to 
sugar and sugar containing products above the agreed commitment limit specified in the 
Schedule of Concessions. It was therefore contended that the EC’s export subsidies were 
violating the Agreement on Agriculture79, the SCM Agreement80, and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 199481.   
In addition, collateral challenges were initiated against the EC’s subsidisation of its sugar 
sector by Australia and Thailand. Owing to the common nature of these challenges, a single 
panel was composed. With respect to these three cases, separate but identical reports were 
recommended by the Panel. The Panel found that the EC’s practices were inconsistent with 
WTO rules as they violated the Agreement on Agriculture. The AB upheld the findings of 
the Panel. The AB also gave its observations on the claims filed under the SCM Agreement 
as they were not addressed in the Panel report.82 
The CGC and CAMEX provided an institutional gateway for the sugar industry to approach 
the government for the protection of its exporting interests. The presence of these public 
sector institutions transformed the nature of informal coordination formed during the 
previously litigated Brazil – Aircraft83 case into an institutionally prescribed partnership. 
With the help of these institutions, lawyers and economic consultants assisted the 
government during the investigation, preparation and litigation of the dispute.84 Their 
services were paid for by the industry, i.e., the sugar cane associations (mainly UNICA)85.  
Several meetings were held between the Ministries, lawyers, consultants and private sector 
representatives during the preparation and litigation of the case. This is described as a 
situation ‘where the lawyers were not preparing the case on their own, but they were 
helping the government and the private sector to prepare the case’.86 The lawyers and 
consultants were marshalling the legal and commercial arguments and briefs; the Ministries 
were vetting, editing and finalising them; and the industry representatives were being 
consulted extensively by the Ministries throughout the entire process.87 
                                                          
78 Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the Common Organization of the Markets in 
the Sugar Sector [2001] OJ L178/1. 
79 Agreement on Agriculture (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/2 arts 3.3, 8, 9.1(a), (c), and 10.1. 
80 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/9 arts 3.1(a) and 3.2. 
81 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/3 arts III:4 and XVI.   
82 For details, see WTO, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS266 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds266_e.htm> accessed 23 October 2013.  
83 Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R, adopted 20 August 1999, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS46/AB/R, DSR 1999:III, 1221. 
84 Shaffer, Badin and Rosenberg (n 41) 383. 
85 See UNICA: Sugarcane Industry Association, About Us <http://english.unica.com.br/> accessed 7 
November 2013.  
86 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34). 
87 Ibid. 
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During the disputes, Pedro de Camargo and Elisabeth Serodio, both former government 
officials, worked as consultants with UNICA. Their past experience in the field and pre-
established contacts with government officials helped the association to coordinate with the 
government.88 They enabled the industry and the government to confide in each other as 
they provided a trustable channel of interaction between the industry associations and the 
ministries. Moreover, media played an important role in this dispute. The case was 
extensively covered by journalists, and this initiative made the public aware of the ongoing 
international trade developments.89 As a result, successful litigation of the case became 
very important for the political leadership. Positive outcome of the litigation was exhibited 
as one of the main achievements of the democratic government during electoral campaigns 
that were concurrently taking place in the country.90 This finding reaffirms that media in 
democratic countries can play an instrumental role in the domestic management of trade 
disputes.  
Finally, the above description usefully outlines a possible composition of PPP 
arrangements. It can clearly be observed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the WTO, UNICA, Sidley Austin and 
Datagro were the key participants involved in the overall litigation process. The 
arrangement also clearly reflects that although the dispute was financed by the industry, the 
government was the leading partner in the dispute as it was closely monitoring and 
coordinating the works of privately hired service providers and private sector 
representatives.   
3.3 US – Upland Cotton 
The US — Upland Cotton91 is a landmark case which exemplifies how a resource-
constrained private sector and a developing country’s government can successfully litigate 
a complex and a long drawn-out WTO case with significant international ramifications. 
Brazil initiated this WTO dispute against the US on the grounds that the US was granting 
prohibited subsidies, actionable subsidies and other forms of assistance to the US 
producers, users and exporters of upland cotton. It contended that the US subsidies to the 
                                                          
88 Shaffer, Badin and Rosenberg, ‘Winning at the WTO’ (n 41) 67, 80. 
89 ‘WTO raps EU over sugar subsidies’ BBC News (London, 4 August 2004) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3536710.stm> accessed 24 October 2013.  The ongoing recent 
developments and updates are also covered by the Brazilian media. See, for example, ‘Brazilian Sugarcane 
Industry Association Calls on European Commission Not to Authorize Sugar Exports Above WTO Ceiling’ 
7KPLCtv.com (Sao Paulo, 25 January 2014) <http://www.kplctv.com/story/11878241/brazilian-sugarcane-
industry-association-calls-on-european-commission-not-to-authorize-sugar-exports-above-wto-ceiling> 
accessed 13 June 2014.  
90 Ibid. 
91 Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, Corr.1, AND Add.1 to Add.3, 
adopted 21 March 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS267/AB/R, DSR 2005:II, 299.  
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“upland cotton industry” were inconsistent with the SCM Agreement92, the Agreement on 
Agriculture93, and the GATT 199494. The Panel upheld the challenge. At the stage of 
appeal, the AB substantially upheld the Panel’s findings.95 
Research indicates that the actual expenditure incurred in the dispute was approximately 
two million US dollars.96 In order to meet these costs, the government and the industry 
collected financial and informational resources through various sources. A newspaper has 
reported that the main sources of funding the dispute included the affected private 
companies, Export Promotion Agency, the government’s budget and proceeds from a 
lottery sale.97 
The CGC worked closely with the Ministry of Agriculture during the initial examination 
and investigation of the dispute. The information and statistical analysis was provided by 
the cotton industry which was mainly led by the Brazilian Association of Cotton Producers 
(ABRAPA)98.99 CGC shared the information (provided by the industry) with the Ministry 
of Agriculture, and hence it served as a communication link between the government 
departments and the industry. Besides that, ABRAPA hired a former official from the 
Ministry of Agriculture to work as a consultant.100  
The complex nature of the case made it difficult for the government to collect the required 
factual and financial resources. It therefore reached out to the industry (producers, 
manufacturers, exporters of varying sizes) to convince them to ‘coordinate and pool their 
resources through a trade association’ in order to help pay for outside legal and economic 
consultants and gathering of information.101 The cotton industry at this stage was 
                                                          
92 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/9 arts 5(c), 6.3(b), (c) 
and (d), 3.1(a), 3.2.  
93 Agreement on Agriculture (12 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/2 arts 3.3, 7.1, 8, 9.1, 10.1. 
94 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/3 art III:4.   
95 For details, see WTO, dispute Settlement: Dispute DS267 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm> accessed 25 October 2013; Ray 
Goldberg, Robert Lawrence and Katie Milligan, ‘Brazil's WTO Cotton Case: Negotiation Through Litigation’ 
in Charan Devereaux, Robert Lawrence and Michael Watkins (eds), Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation: 
Resolving Disputes (Volume 2, Peterson Institute Press 2006) 235. 
96 Calculations based on empirical investigation conducted in Shaffer, Badin and Rosenberg (n 41) 460.  
97 PC Mello, ‘Cotton producers are raffle to fund the WTO panel’ PC Estado De Sao Paulo (18 September 
2003) <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=000166&pid=S0104-
4478200700010000600016&lng=es> 28 October 2013. 
98 ABRAPA: About Us <http://www.abrapa.com.br/institucional/Paginas/A-ABRAPA.aspx#quemsomos> 
accessed 28 October 2013.  
99 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34); Venilson Ferreira and Angelo Ikeda, ‘U.S. suspends 
compensation to Brazilian producer’ Economia & Negocios (Brasilia & Sao Paulo, 8 August 2013) 
<http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,eua-suspendem-indenizacao-a-produtor-brasileiro-
,1061750,0.htm> accessed 28 October 2013 [The news article notes that ABRAPA paid the cost of litigation 
that was incurred during the Panel proceedings.].  
100 Pedro de Camargo Neto, Former Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Agriculture [Shaffer, Badin and 
Rosenberg (n 41) 449]. 
101 Ibid, 459. 
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insufficiently resourced to finance the litigation and to assist the government throughout the 
case.102 A government official confirms that ‘the cotton industry was fragile and not very 
organized during these years’103. The cotton industry therefore incurred only a part of the 
initial costs spent on hiring lawyers, consultants and gathering information during the initial 
stages of the dispute.104 Due to the fact that the litigation lasted for several years (2002-
2005), and the post-litigation proceedings were also carried out for a considerable period of 
time (2005-2012), the cotton industry ‘ran out of their available yet limited funds’ and 
eventually discontinued its resource support to the government.105  
With the available funding, the industry (together with the government) hired the US based 
law firm, Sidley Austin. It also hired a US based economist to conduct the economic 
analysis. The economist was hired to explain and interpret the economic formulas and 
calculations used for providing subsidies to the US cotton industry.106 The litigation work, 
i.e., preparing briefs and submissions, attending hearings, assisting the government to 
answer the issues raised during adjudication, analysing the legal and economic position of 
the case, marshalling commercial and legal arguments and related tasks, were jointly 
performed by the law firm and the economist.107 Their working was closely supervised and 
guided by the government lawyers at CGC.108 
Furthermore, considerable support from voluntary organisations (such as Oxfam) was given 
during the post-litigation phase. Oxfam was engaged in international campaigning which 
helped to generate some pressure on the US authorities to remove its subsidies. They also 
monitored the implementation performance of the US and helped the Brazilian Government 
to prepare its submissions and gather evidence on non-implementation as was required for 
the compliance proceedings.109  The voluntary sector therefore played an important role, 
especially during the post-litigation stage through campaigns, monitoring and research. 
The case was a long fought battle between a developed and a developing country, the latter 
with a resource-constrained industry at stake. Nevertheless, the case strengthens the 
argument, as initially laid down in the introductory section, that PPP is a vital requirement 
for conducting WTO litigations, especially when the complainant or the respondent is a 
                                                          
102 Interview with an official, Government of Brazil [Name and details withheld] [The interviewee observes 
the following: ‘…the cotton producers allegedly were concerned about the cost of the case and asked the 
government to fund it, but the government refused, stating that it lacked funds’.] 
103 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34). 
104 ‘U.S. must break pay to Brazil relative to cotton, says Secretary of Agriculture of the country’ (ABRAPA, 8 
October 2012) <http://www.abrapa.com.br/noticias/Paginas/EUA-deve-romper-pagamento-ao-Brasil-relativo-
a-algodao-diz-secretario-de-Agricultura-do-pais.aspx> accessed 28 October 2013 [The webpage notes that 
‘the Abrapa...underwrote the costs of the panel against the U.S. in the WTO...’.] 
105 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34). 
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid, 460; confirmed in interview with Eduardo Chikusa (n 41). 
108 Interview with Eduardo Chikusa (n 41). 
109 Shaffer, Badin and Rosenberg (n 41) 463.  
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resource-constrained developing country. The commercial information can most viably be 
gathered by the affected business entities, and the governments cannot perform this task 
effectively without support from the affected private sector. The developing country 
governments might also struggle to hire lawyers and consultants for preparing and litigating 
a case without the private sector’s financial support.  
It is also worth mentioning that the collaborative work of the team of lawyers, economists 
and subject-specific consultants provided the government with strong and comprehensive 
arguments. It may not be possible for legal experts to comprehend and translate commercial 
data and economic formulas from the legal point of view.110 Similarly, it may not be 
possible for economic and technical experts to interpret and incorporate commercial 
information and analysis into the legal texts.111 A successful litigation, especially in cases 
with a complex or technical nature, may therefore require a team consisting of lawyers, 
economists and subject-specific experts. Collaborative work by different experts ensures 
that the gaps between legal analysis, economic explanations and commercial evaluation are 
not left unfilled. 
The case also puts into focus a situation where the government had to finance the later 
stages of the dispute (mainly the stages of appeal and compliance) as the industry fell short 
of the required funds. This may indicate that, especially in complex cases with expected 
longer time frames for settlement, the government should not rely entirely on private 
funding or a small reserve of resources available with the government department. 
Additional financial arrangements should be made to finance the litigation that can possibly 
go beyond a calculated time frame. To this end, the governments can create an exigency 
fund or a standing budget for meeting such additional expenses.112 
Finally, the case also confirms that an organized private sector is an essential requirement 
for the formation of effective PPPs. The cotton industry, for instance, was insufficiently 
organized, and it could form an initial partnership with the government only after 
establishing its trade association (ABRAPA). But due to inadequate financial means within 
this newly constituted association, and the complexity and length of the case, the 
Association could not provide resources to the government throughout the stages of Panel, 
Appellate and Compliance proceedings. The case indicates that developing country 
governments can face severe constraints in enforcing their WTO rights if they lack an 
organized business community or if a trade barrier is affecting the interests of a less-
organized business community. The phenomenon of less-organized industries with limited 
resources is more prevalent in developing countries. Therefore, it is important to devise 
ways for organizing business interests in developing countries for the effective formation of 
PPPs and the successful conduct of WTO disputes.  
                                                          
110 Interview with Moushami Joshi (n 18). 
111 Interview with an official representative, TEXPROCIL (Mumbai, India, 27 June 2013) [Name withheld]. 
112 Interview with Niall Meagher, ACWL (Geneva, Switzerland, 11 April 2013). 
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3.4 EC - Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee 
In European Communities — Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee113, the Brazilian 
Government, at the request of its soluble coffee industry, launched formal consultations 
with the EU. Brazil’s main contention was that the EU’s Preferential Tariff Scheme (under 
the Generalised System of Preferences) was injuring the exporting interests of the Brazilian 
soluble coffee industry, and the practice was inconsistent with the Enabling Clause and 
Article I of GATT 1994. The dispute did not reach the stage of Panel as it was settled 
between the parties during consultations.114 
The industry association partnering the government in this matter was the Brazilian Soluble 
Coffee Industry Association (ABICS). The cost incurred during the investigation and 
consultation stage was mainly borne by the coffee industry.115 It provided information and 
commercial evidence to the government as required during the investigation and 
preparation of consultation requests. In addition, ABICS hired private legal consultant 
(Veirano Advogados) to provide assistance to the government to carry out the legal analysis 
of the dispute.116 
Shortly after the commencement of formal consultations, the EU made a conditional 
proposal. It proposed lifting the alleged tariff from the Brazilian coffee exports on the 
condition that Brazil would not proceed with the dispute.117 Once the condition was 
accepted by the Government of Brazil, the EU removed the alleged tariffs from coffee 
exports and therefore granted a larger market access to the coffee industry in Brazil.118 The 
seemingly favourable concession was accompanied with an understanding that the 
‘.....“sensitive” farm imports will continue to be restricted through quotas and other non-
tariff barriers. These products include sugar, cereals, dairy products, tobacco, meat and 
some fruits – all of which are Brazilian exports.’119  
                                                          
113 European Communities — Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee, WT/DS209, in consultations on 12 October 
2000. 
114 For details, see WTO, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS154 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds154_e.htm> accessed 12 October 2014; M Osava, 
‘Commodities: Brazil-EU Dispute over Instant Coffee Goes to WTO’ Inter Press Service (Rio De Janeiro, 16 
February 1998) <http://www.ipsnews.net/1998/02/commodities-brazil-eu-dispute-over-instant-coffee-goes-to-
wto/> accessed 10 September 2013; Also see Marislei Nishijima and Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes, ‘Tariff 
Discrimination on Brazil’s Soluble Coffee: an Economic Analysis’ (2010) 30(2) Brazilian Journal of Political 
Economy 293 [The article confirms that the EU’s discriminatory tariff had an adverse impact on the foreign 
market access of the Brazilian soluble coffee industry.] 
115 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34). 
116 Shaffer, Badin and Rosenberg (n 41) 491. 
117 M Osava, ‘EU lifts tariffs on Brazilian soluble coffee’ Third World Network (Rio de Janeiro, 11 July 2001) 
<http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/soluble.htm> accessed 05 July 2012; European Commission, ‘The EU and 
Brazil solve dispute over soluble coffee’ IP/01/987 (Brussels, 11 July 2001) <europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-01-987_en.pdf> accessed 24 October 2013. 
118 Osava (n 117). 
119 Ibid. 
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The concession offered by the EU, along with its accompanying condition, was accepted by 
the Brazilian Government. Hence, the coffee industry managed to restore its lost market 
access in the EU with the help of the privately-funded inter-governmental consultations. On 
the other hand, the Brazilian Government allegedly chose to selectively defend the 
exporting interests of its coffee industry in a situation where the EU’s protectionist policies 
were also injuring the interests of its other industrial sectors.120 No manifest attempts were 
made by the government to protect the interests of the other affected sectors as Brazil was 
implicitly refrained from further challenging the EU’s GSP scheme.   
The present dispute exemplifies the possibility of certain regulatory threats which such 
partnerships can face. It illustrates an instance of a possible clash of interests, i.e., a conflict 
between the special economic interests of the soluble coffee industry versus wider 
economic interests of various farm based sectors, where the former prevailed over the latter 
interest.121 This instance could also be seen as a case of ‘private capture’ or ‘corporate 
regulatory capture’ where the coffee industry, to some extent, captured the governmental 
authority for the protection of its market interests.122 Such regulatory problems can 
especially emerge in countries which have high levels of corruption and poor observance of 
‘rule of law’.  
Dispute settlement partnerships can provide greater opportunities for engaging in 
corruption, bribery or lobbying to business entities and government officials who may seek 
to protect their respective financial interests.123 Where a government official weighs 
financial contributions on a higher scale, a profit-motivated business entity might secure a 
chance to induce a government action that selectively protects its business interests even at 
the cost of wide economic, social or environmental interests.124 In this manner, a privately-
funded action can possibly lead to a situation of private capture or corporate regulatory 
capture where government officials can be inclined (for various reasons) to uphold private 
interests at the cost of national interest.125 This is a potential limitation of PPP approach, 
since capture of national interests, including wide economic, social, environmental, ethical 
and welfare interests, by a handful of profit-motivated organisations or individuals is never 
a winning situation, and effective PPP arrangements should always try to balance such 
competing interests in the best interests of the nation and industry.  
                                                          
120 Ibid. 
121 A Brazilian government representative referred to this as the problem of ‘clashing interests’ between 
private and public sectors. {Interview with Government Representative, Brazil [Name and details withheld]}. 
122 Abigail C Deshman, ‘Horizontal Review between International Organizations: Why, How, and Who Cares 
about Corporate Regulatory Capture’ (2011) 22(4) European Journal of International Law 1089 [The article 
demonstrates a situation of corporate regulatory capture with the help of a case study of World Health 
Organization.] 
123 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, ‘Protection for Sale’ (1994) 84(4) The American Economic 
Review 833.  
124 Grossman and Helpman, Special Interest Politics (n 23) 241.  
125 Deshman (n 122) [The article demonstrates a situation of corporate regulatory capture with the help of a 
case study of World Health Organization.] 
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4. BRAZILIAN PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: FURTHER 
ANALYSIS 
4.1 Nature and Elements of PPP 
With the help of the above exposition, the case study has conceptualised the nature and 
elements of PPP arrangements in Brazil. The PPP in Brazil is flexible, semi-formal and 
dynamic in nature. It is flexible as the government and private sector can coordinate and 
exchange resources through varied procedures and channels, depending upon the 
requirements of each case. The private sector can either approach the Dispute Settlement 
Unit or their subject-specific Ministry through a trade association or on its own. 
Government officials can approach private sector representatives and seek their assistance 
in any way at any stage of dispute settlement. Moreover, there are no fixed guidelines for 
financing litigation as the issues of financing mostly depend upon multiple factors 
including the nature of a dispute.126 A government official confirms that ‘it has been 
possible to adjust and revise our approach and financing procedures with every case we 
have conducted’.127 
The PPP arrangement is semi-formal in nature as it is guided and facilitated by specialised 
procedures and institutions established for the management of trade disputes. These 
procedures have not been documented or published officially. In other words, the Brazilian 
PPP is institutionalised, but unlike the EU’s TBR Mechanism, it is not entirely formalised, 
because: 
1. it does not confer a right on the private sector to file trade grievances in the form 
of written complaints, and  
2. it does not impose any obligation on the government to examine and consider 
such complaints from the industry.128 
It is dynamic as the procedures have gradually evolved according to the changing domestic 
conditions and the nature of disputes litigated and defended by the government. Different 
strategies of dispute settlement and PPPs have evolved at different times. Some of these 
strategies which have introduced effectiveness to the process include: the creation of 
business coalitions, the creation of think tanks, academic networks and research groups 
working in international trade law, the direct participation of privately-hired counsels in 
WTO hearings, creation of specialised and dedicated institutions and procedures, and 
development of domestic legal expertise through the provision of internships and training. 
These features have facilitated effective exchange between the government and industries, 
                                                          
126 Interview with Celso de Tarso Pereira (n 34).  
127 Ibid; Interview with Eduardo Chikusa (n 41).  
128 Ibid; Veiga (n 43) 178. 
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and hence, they have played a capacity-building role. These developments and strategies 
can therefore be considered by other developing countries which are seeking to establish 
such flexible, ad-hoc and semi-formal PPPs.   
Shaffer argues that it is the combination of a ‘professionalised Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, 
an ‘inter-ministerial Chamber’, a ‘specialised Dispute Settlement Unit’, and a ‘relatively 
well-organised business sector’ with ‘large, export-oriented companies’ and trade 
associations that has enabled Brazil to become a leading developing country at the WTO 
DSM.129 As mentioned before, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has become professionalised 
(and specialised) in handling foreign trade matters. Officials there are experts in 
international trade and are appointed through a competitive selection process.130 With the 
creation of specialised units having dedicated and well-qualified staff members, the 
Ministry has been able to tap and retain relevant expertise and experience in international 
trade law and policy it has developed over time.  
CAMEX, an inter-ministerial institution established for the management of foreign trade 
concerns, is also an interesting development as it has enabled the government to consolidate 
its approach on trade matters and proceed in an informed and coordinated manner to 
achieve expertise and an optimum utilisation of resources. A professionally qualified, well-
staffed and responsive Permanent Mission of Brazil to the WTO can also be seen as one of 
the key reasons for its success at the WTO. Brazil has utilised its WTO Mission to enhance 
its organisational and cultural knowledge of WTO; this has partly been done by the 
appointment of its Foreign Affairs Ministers as the Ambassadors to WTO and through the 
secondment of its government officials and lawyers at the Mission.  
Brazil’s WTO participation is further strengthened with the help of its wealthy and large 
industries such as oil and aircraft, as large entrepreneurs with significant trading stakes can 
better participate in the management of disputes. Moreover, its ‘pluralistic’ private sector 
community, which consists of strong trade associations, confederation of industries, 
multinational private companies, well-resourced business coalitions, private consultancies 
and law firms (accompanied by various supporting agencies such as monitoring 
institutions, think tanks and research networks), has also strengthened the dispute 
settlement capacity of Brazil. One of the most widely proposed reasons for Brazil’s success 
at WTO DSM is its “organised private sector”, which is a vital requirement for the 
establishment and smooth functioning of the proposed partnership.131  
                                                          
129 Shaffer, Badin and Rosenberg (n 41) 404.  
130 Ibid. 
131 From an economic perspective, there are multiple factors (such as productivity, work force, economic 
output, profits, industry size, wage rate and literacy) which determine whether an industry is organised or 
unorganised. However, the term “organised private sector” or “organised industry” in this thesis is used to 
refer to an industry that has the following characteristics: 1. Industries that are strongly represented by trade 
associations, confederations, export promotion councils or chambers of commerce; 2. Industries with 
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The significance of an organised private sector is two-fold. First, it facilitates an industry to 
represent a wide economic interest in order to influence and convince the government to 
initiate an investigation or consultation. Second, it enables industry representatives to 
gather and consolidate the required resources possessed by affected business entities. The 
industry representatives may require these resources to monitor and investigate foreign 
measures, and to assist the government with the investigation and overall management of 
foreign trade disputes.132 On the other hand, an industry with ‘less sophisticated’ 
associations and a ‘fragmented industry’ with ‘small companies’ and ‘disintegrated 
representatives’ may reduce the capacity-building potential of the partnership approach due 
to limited financial resources, political influence and commercial stakes.133  
The wealthy businesses, even in the absence of an industry representative, may still be able 
to assist the government with the required financial and evidential resources. However, in 
the absence of an organised private sector representing a broad economic interest, the 
smaller and resource-constrained firms would generally struggle to convince the 
government to litigate their trade interests at WTO DSM.134 If they somehow manage to 
convince the government, they may not be able to participate effectively and assist the 
process of dispute settlement. Hence, in the absence of a resourceful and well-connected 
industry representative, the private sector may not be able to form an effective dispute 
settlement partnership with the government. As a result, the government might not be able 
to acquire the capacity required to identify barriers or conduct trade disputes. The situation 
may ultimately frustrate the aim of the proposed PPP mechanism, i.e., domestic capacity-
building.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
established channels of communication and exchange between producers, manufacturers, exporters, importers 
and their representative organisations; 3. Industries in which the exporters, importers and their representatives 
are aware of international trade developments, foreign and national trade policies affecting their business 
interests and the possibility of approaching their governments to address trade grievances. 4. Industries that 
have the capacity and know-how to gather information and other required resources which may be required 
for presenting trade grievances in well-substantiated and investigated manner to their governments.  
132 Grossman and Helpman, Special Interest Politics (n 23). [‘An organised group can take advantage of the 
economies of scale by researching issues centrally and educating its rank-and-file members. The groups also 
may use the information they gather to win over policymakers…’] 
133 Bohanes and Garza (n 12) 83 [‘It would make little sense for one individual company to lobby the 
government to initiate action at the WTO against a trade barrier. Rather, a more rational course of action for 
that one company would be to adjust to the trade barrier and/or seek other export markets, especially when the 
company cannot tolerate revenue fluctuations.’]  
134 An official representative from TEXPROCIL, India said that ‘we lost one year in convincing the 
Government of India to initiate consultations with Turkey in the dispute of Turkey-Cotton Yarn. It was due to 
the fact that we were the only players, without constant support from the companies and confederations, who 
were going to the Government again and again with various trade issues. It is crucial that the industry should 
provide support to its trade associations for better protection of individual interests.’ {Interview with an 
official representative, TEXPROCIL (Mumbai, India, 27 June 2013) [Name withheld]}. 
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4.2 Regulatory Threat: A Possible Shortcoming 
Dispute settlement partnerships have frequently been formed between the government and 
different industry sectors in Brazil and these partnerships have often enabled their 
participants to achieve their respective goals. Different industries in Brazil, such as coffee, 
sugar, poultry and aircraft have managed to restore their lost market access. The 
government, partially with the help of these successful litigations, has gained the status of 
an emerging global economy having an effective system of governance.135 However, the 
partnership has not been able to survive when an industry has fallen short of resources, such 
as in the Cotton case, where the partnership disappeared after the initial stages of dispute 
due to shortage of resources within the private sector. The government, especially after the 
Panel stage, had to finance the case and gather additional information on its own.136 
Moreover, the existing literature and the empirical investigation have not identified any 
dispute in which small scale industries (such as footwear, wood products and clothing 
sectors) in Brazil have been able to approach and partner the government in any WTO 
litigation.137 
These observations lead to a possible inference that PPP arrangements can generally enable 
resourceful business actors to protect their exporting interests through a governmental 
action at the WTO. But the same result may not be achieved in cases where the exporting 
interests of resource-constrained, developing and small scale industries are at stake. In other 
words, the formation of dispute settlement partnership may lead to a situation of 
discrimination between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ industries in Brazil. This is a 
potential limitation of PPP approach. However, it is beyond the scope of this investigation 
to suggest strategies for engaging those private entities which cannot afford or otherwise 
discharge the partnership obligations. Nevertheless, the aspect of wider and fuller 
engagement of private sector is a topical issue which can be explored by future researchers.   
These observations, along with above-mentioned regulatory concerns, point to the fact that 
the formation of PPPs without a regulatory framework may result in a discriminatory and 
broadly jeopardizing protection of special economic interests. More so, amidst the stark 
wealth inequality in Brazil, its PPP arrangement can fall short of granting an equal right of 
                                                          
135 ‘Globalisation and Emerging Economies’ (March 2009) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Policy Brief <http://www.oecd.org/tad/tradedev/42324460.pdf> accessed 30 October 2013; 
Knowledge @ Wharton: Finance ‘Lessons from Brazil: Why Is It Bouncing Back While Other Markets 
Stumble’ (Wharton University of Pennsylvania, 11 November 2009) 
<http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/lessons-from-brazil-why-is-it-bouncing-back-while-other-
markets-stumble/> accessed 30 October 2013.  
136 Interview with Government Representative, Brazil [Name and details withheld]. 
137 Rajshri Jayaram and Peter F Lanjaw, ‘Small Scale Industry, Environment Regulation and Poverty: The 
Case of Brazil’ (2004) 18 (3) The World Bank Economic Review 443, 447; Matleena Kniivila, ‘Industrial 
Development and Economic Growth: Implications for Poverty Reduction and Income Inequality’ in 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Industrial Development for the 21st Century: Sustainable 
Development Perspectives (United Nations 2007) 295, 316-7.  
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access to all economic sectors because the treatment of “rule of law” remains ‘tilted’ in 
favour of wealthy and politically influential businesses in Brazil.138 Hence, it is important 
for a partnership arrangement to have established regulatory provisions that can possibly 
reduce such instances of discrimination and ensure that the governments make strategic 
choices in the interests of the nation. It is also important that the government should always 
take the leading role in such partnerships, and it should be able to filter and prioritise claims 
and disputes in relation to their potential scope, overall impact, and their harmony with the 
wider economic, social and environmental interests. An effective regulation is a vital 
prerequisite for a balanced exchange of resources, and it should aim to ensure that a 
partnership arrangement is regulated in such a way that the interests of a nation and a 
private sector are properly balanced with each other, and that the protection of latter does 
not lead to the infringement of former. 
The starting point of devising regulatory provisions could be the study and examination of 
existing regulatory practices which certain Member States have followed. For example, the 
US and the EU have introduced certain initiatives to regulate their WTO dispute settlement 
partnership operations. The US Department of Commerce pursues the practice of “calling 
for comments” and holding “public hearings” with the stakeholders, interested persons and 
the public at large with respect to foreign trade issues and dispute settlement.139 As part of 
its transparency commitments, it also publishes its determinations concerning petitions filed 
by the private sector, along with the ‘description of facts on which such determination is 
based’.140 The European Commission has also introduced a similar practice of public 
solicitation with respect to foreign policy making processes. The European Commission 
consults private entities, civil society organisations and the public at large with respect to 
foreign trade policies and initiatives on a regular basis.141 The Commission also regularly 
publishes its determinations, statement of reasons, dispute settlement updates, status and 
progress reports and briefs filed at WTO.142  
                                                          
138 Pio (n 36) 4.  
139 One such example is USTR press release: ‘USTR Calls for Comments on Intellectual Property Protection 
and Enforcement’ (USTR, January 2012) <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2010/january/ustr-calls-comments-intellectual-property-protecti> accessed 29 October 2012. The US 
also seeks public opinion on their proposed regulations and related documents via a web portal 
regulations.gov <www.regulations.gov> accessed 29 October 2012. The provisions for public hearing for the 
presentation of views upon request are provided in US Trade Act 1974, ss 305 (b) (1) (A), 302 (a) (4), 306 (c) 
(2). {Act of 1974, Public Law No 93-618, 88 Stat 1978, 19 USC Ch 12, § 2411-2420 [As Amended Through 
Public Law No 112–208, Enacted 14 December 2012]. Full text at 
<http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/19C12.txt> accessed 15 October 2012} 
140 US Trade Act 1974, s 301 (d) (3) (c) (iii).  
141 European Commission: Trade, Public Consultation <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/> accessed 29 
October 2012. Council Regulation, art 8(1) (a) obliges the Commission to announce the initiation of an 
examination procedure in response to a petition within a fixed time ‘within which the interested parties may 
apply to be heard orally by the Commission’. (For full citation, see n 49).  
142 See Council Regulation, arts 8(1) (a) and 12. (For full citation, see n 49). 
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Brazil has also realised the emerging need to deal with potential regulatory challenges, and 
this is evident from several transparency provisions and practices the government has 
employed. For instance, it has employed the practice of seeking public opinion on proposed 
trade policies, bilateral negotiations, trade disputes and resolutions.143 Besides that, the 
Brazilian Ministry of Commerce has published its resolutions, regulations, negotiation 
outcomes and trade proposals online, making them widely available to the people at large. 
Brazil has also introduced a procedure through which the Ministry of Commerce appoints 
representatives from civil societies and social service agencies to its various governmental 
committees including the Management Executive Committee (GECEX).144 These 
provisions have, to some extent, enhanced transparency in the Brazilian management of 
trade disputes.145 Developing countries with similar domestic circumstances (such as the 
levels of corruption and the state of “rule of law”) should consider the proposed PPP 
approach in light of these regulatory concerns and the discussed transparency-enhancing 
practices that can regulate such partnerships.  
4.3 Formal versus Informal PPP Arrangements 
Dispute settlement partnerships could either be formal or informal in nature. Formal 
partnerships are those where private entities are granted a right to approach their 
government if and when their trade interests are infringed by a foreign practice. 
Correspondingly, the government has an obligation to administer and examine the concerns 
and complaints received from the private entities. For instance, the US has a formal PPP 
mechanism that provides a right to its private stakeholders to petition the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) if their trade interests are infringed.146 On the other hand, 
partnership arrangements that are formed without such formal rights and obligations, 
through casual exchange between government and industry, are considered as informal 
partnership arrangements.  When examined in accordance with this typology, the Brazilian 
partnership approach is largely informal. This informal and flexible arrangement of PPP in 
Brazil has worked well in various WTO cases. Nevertheless, the Brazilian government is 
discussing the potential benefits and viability of introducing a formal system of PPP.147 The 
question of whether a formal mechanism of PPP (similar to the one in the US) will be more 
effective than the present informal means of PPP is difficult to answer. A government 
official has observed the following:  
                                                          
143 A recent example is the call for public comments ‘Secex opens public consultation on negotiating 
agreements with the EU and Canada’ (CAMEX, 26 September 2012) 
<http://www.camex.gov.br/noticias/ler/item/218> accessed 29 October 2012.  
144 For the composition of GECEX, see CAMEX, GECEX 
<http://www.camex.gov.br/conteudo/exibe/area/1/menu/4/Comit%C3%AA%20Executivo%20de%20Gest%C
3%A3o%20-%20GECEX> accessed 29 October 2012.  
145 Pio (n 36). 
146 Section 301 procedure (Sections 301-310, Trade Act of 1974). For full citation, see n 139 .  
147 Interview with Eduardo Chikusa (n 41).  
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[t]he private sector is satisfied with the present informal ways of 
coordination, and they have had almost no problems with it. We receive 
applications from the private sector very often, they identify barriers, assist 
us in various tasks, and the issues are resolved in close coordination with 
them. Seven different Ministries compose CAMEX, and each Ministry has 
close contacts with their industries. Therefore, industries know the right 
channel and authority to contact when they are faced with a foreign barrier. 
Hence, it is difficult to find a concrete reason for establishing formal 
provisions of PPP in Brazil. But the debate is still very much ongoing.148 
It is believed that such informal and ad-hoc partnerships provide industries with an 
opportunity to express their interests to the government in an informal, non-litigious and 
casual manner. This observation is confirmed during an interview with a private sector 
representative from Brazil. The representative states that ‘...approaching the government 
officials for such matters is not a difficult task as we live in a highly democratic society. If 
we have a problem, we may approach the government officials by a phone call or an email 
or a visit to Brasilia, to which they are often very responsive.’149  
On the other hand, there are clear advantages of a formal PPP arrangement. A formal 
mechanism can empower industries.150 The mechanism can provide a right for private 
stakeholders to approach its government if and when its trade interests are infringed by a 
foreign practice.151 Such a right can become particularly useful for industries which 
otherwise lack ‘political or financial traction to attract the attention of their national 
government’.152 A formal mechanism can help such industries secure a share of their 
government’s resources for resolving their market access problems. Moreover, a formal 
partnership, similar to the US’s Section 301 mechanism153 and the EU’s TBR 
mechanism154, can provide for well-defined procedures of coordination and management of 
foreign trade disputes. Robustly defined unambiguous procedures are advantageous for 
encouraging and guiding private-public solicitation and resource exchange in a transparent, 
predictable and well-established manner.  
The above arguments and counterarguments demonstrate that it is very difficult to provide 
a definite answer to the dilemma of whether Brazil should follow the footsteps of the US 
and the EU by establishing a formal PPP mechanism for the future management of trade 
                                                          
148 Ibid. 
149 Interview with Private Sector Representative (28 October 2013) [Name and details withheld]. 
150 Interview with a trade lawyer (26 June 2016) [Name and details withheld] 
151 Debra Johnson and Colin Turner, European Business: Policy Challenges for the New Commercial 
Environment (Taylor & Francis 1998) 319. 
152 Interview with a trade lawyer (26 June 2016) [Name and details withheld] 
153 See n 139.  
154 See n 49.  
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disputes. It is also difficult to address the highly contentious issue of whether a formal PPP 
system is more effective than an informal system of coordination. However, solving this 
dilemma, which can potentially be a promising area for future scholarship, is beyond the 
scope of this research.  
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The present investigation has explored the possibilities of engaging the private sector in the 
intergovernmental process of WTO dispute management, the elements required for 
government-industry coordination, and the reforms that will be required, particularly in 
developing countries, for ensuring the predictability of rules or procedures governing the 
reciprocal exchange of resources. The challenges confronting PPP approach and the 
suggested proposals discussed in the previous sections have outlined the important issues 
and elements that should be considered by a country which is aspiring to enhance its 
dispute settlement capacity through the proposed partnership approach.  
The Brazilian PPP experience should prompt other developing countries to seriously 
consider establishing effective procedures of PPP for the enforcement of international trade 
rights. The argument here is based on the premise that the research findings have confirmed 
the capacity-building potential of dispute settlement partnership approach. However, a 
similar strategy for dispute settlement cannot as such be employed by all developing 
countries because the political and economic conditions in other countries may not be as 
conducive for the functioning of similar PPP arrangements as they are in Brazil. Hence, this 
article in no manner suggests that the above-mentioned features of PPP mechanism or a 
common procedure of interaction can produce similarly positive results in all developing 
countries. Multiple domestic conditions, including the nature of political governance, 
structure of economy, political circumstances, policies and social values, and bureaucratic 
frameworks in a country can shape and influence the functioning and effectiveness of PPP 
strategies, and hence, a common mechanism cannot be viable or beneficial to all. However, 
the strategies and features of PPP mechanism identified and analysed in this article can be 
examined by other developing countries in accordance with their individual circumstances 
and requirements.  
It is essential for developing countries to devise a clear roadmap of how to enhance their 
WTO dispute settlement capacity. It is also important that specific provisions and 
procedures are devised for the handling of disputes and formation of partnerships. They can 
be devised either in the form of laws and regulations, or PPP arrangements can be 
facilitated by an institutional framework devised at the domestic level. The Member States 
could also manage disputes and engage the private sector without a legal, regulatory or an 
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institutional framework, as long as the procedures of partnership and dispute management 
are robustly defined to enhance the transparency and predictability of rules.  
It is one thing to be a part of WTO agreements and know the WTO rules, and the other is to 
know how to use and take advantage of those agreements and rules in practice. The above 
findings and discussions provide an illustration of how developing countries can engage 
private stakeholders for the utilization of DSU provisions and how they can enhance their 
dispute settlement capacities with the help of such domestic, ad-hoc and dynamic 
partnerships. In other words, the study provides an indicative roadmap of what is required 
and what can be done at the domestic level to take advantage of opportunities (created by 
WTO DSU) at the international level. Developing countries can “learn lessons” by peer 
reviewing the dispute settlement partnership experience of Brazil. They can observe how 
Brazil has gradually overcome the problems, at least to some extent, which they face today 
at WTO DSU.  
